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ABSTRACT
Scholars and activists concerned with eliminating violence and
discrimination against lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and
intersex (LGBTI) people have generated passionate conversations
about pursuing law reform to make injuries, intimacies, and
identities visible while challenging how legal systems continue to
marginalise queers. My paper contributes to these conversations
by using emotion as an analytic register to navigate the ways case
law seeks to ‘progress’ the intimacies and identities of LGBTI
people from positions of injury. In doing so, I introduce a new
approach to queer activist legal scholarship by reading emotion in
law on two levels: I target its enactment in what I call ‘pro-LGBTI
cases’ and it forms the register in which I pursue my evaluation of
those cases. Rather than develop this analysis around specific
doctrines or jurisdictions, I create my own activist-scholarly
narrative by reading emotions through their enactments in pro-
LGBTI cases that cross various sub-disciplines of law. From hate
crime laws to marriage equality cases, this paper navigates
competing emotions, such as hate and love, which simultaneously
structure legal progress. Reading emotion enables us to address
how legal recognition and visibility can work, paradoxically, to
cover the queer injuries, intimacies, and identities they seek to
address.
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Introduction
Movements for justice and equality generate emotion, particularly among those who par-
ticipate in them. For many activists and scholars, justice and equality involve a turn to the
law. Law is (or is at least seen to be) a space in which minorities can claim what is ‘just’.
Such justness is rarely disembodied – it is often attributed to a sense of feeling (such as
vindication or satisfaction) on the part of those who have been victimised. For minorities
who occupy positions of potential vulnerability, whether on the basis of our sexual orien-
tation or gender identity, it is not difficult to see and feel the emotions that arise in activism
and scholarship when law reform is heralded as a means to remedy homophobic and
transphobic injuries such as inequality, discrimination, and violence. This paper takes
up some of the emotional dimensions of queer legal progress to expand the scope of
queer activist legal scholarship. I develop this analysis by exploring how contemporary
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hate crime and marriage equality cases in the United States (US) enact emotion to address
homophobic and transphobic injuries that limit the expression of queer intimacies and
identities.
I begin this paper by outlining activist and scholarly responses to progress made by
sexual and gender minorities in recent years. Specifically, I note the ways in which
queer activist legal scholars define the terms of legal progress and how emotion, while
present, has been obscured as both a framework and object of analysis in these discussions.
I then offer two contributions to furthering queer activist legal scholarship in the area of
lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersex (LGBTI) human rights. First, I situate
what I mean by ‘pro-LGBTI cases’ – a category that includes case law that is held out
by activists and scholars as a sign of legal progress for sexual and gender minorities.
Second, I discuss how to ‘read emotion’ in this jurisprudence and why a queer reading
of law using emotion enables us, as activist-scholars working in law, to evaluate the
nature of ‘progress’ made possible by law. In the latter parts of the paper, I develop
these affective contributions to queer activist legal scholarship by exploring how compet-
ing emotions, such as hate and love, structure socio-legal claims of progress in US hate
crime and marriage equality cases.
Que(e)rying activist legal scholarship
Drawing from rich traditions in critical legal studies, I define ‘activist legal scholarship’ as
intellectual inquiries aimed at exposing the ways in which legal systems oppress minorities
and providing critiques and/or prescriptions for remedying such injustices.1 There are
multiple forms of such activist legal scholarship, which are beyond the scope of this
paper. In this section, I focus my inquiry on how the demands of legal activism and scho-
larly inquiry can come into tension. As Frank Munger observes, this tension manifests
when the call of legal activism to pursue forms of action (such as law reform) that
address pressing human rights abuses brushes against the call of scholarship that leads
to pursuing intellectual curiosities and undesirable questions that may require suspensions
of moral judgement.2
LGBTI law reforms reflect this tension through the emotional push by queers to be
‘seen’. Over the last 50 years, feelings such as despair, anger, hope, and happiness (to
name just a few) have animated activist, academic, and advocacy debates over the capacity
of law to recognise homophobic injuries, queer intimacies, and sexual identities. Courts, as
arenas for LGBTI individuals to challenge the legality of various forms of institutional dis-
crimination, have been increasingly important for individuals wishing to vindicate their
human rights.3 For legal scholars interested in, and motivated by concerns for, the well-
being of minorities in social and legal contexts, academic inquiry has been directed at
recognising and addressing how jurisprudence poses problems and promises progress.4
In demands for social justice, equality-minded socio-legal scholars have regarded pro-
gressive judgments ushering in law reform as positive outcomes, given the enormous pur-
chase they have in society. For example, Yvonne Zylan argues that reforms directed at
sexual or gender minorities not only confer legal recognition but also symbolise increased
(public) acceptance of LGBTI visibility.5 Reflecting an instrumentalist idea of the relation-
ship between law and social change, Chris Ashford suggests that statutes and case law
provide an easily discernible benchmark for measuring the progress made towards
recognising sexual minorities and exposing what remains to be done.6 These and other
scholars have cast legal reforms as markers on a metaphorical ruler of social justice –
markers that we still use to measure, and ultimately feel, the changes that have taken
place in society.
Progressive jurisprudence, however, operates as a paradox: it can represent the interests
of those who are ‘disempowered’ but only by limiting the terms of representation. Rather
than pursuing abstract rights claims, Lisa Bower advocates a ‘direct address’ to the courts –
one that refuses static representations or legal language to shape new modes of recog-
nition.7 Ruthann Robson notes that ‘context is a dominant consideration’ in any under-
standing of how judicial review operates.8 I would add that understanding judicial
reasoning in progressive cases requires more than a contextual consideration of what
shapes changing legal norms.9 John Fisher argues that queer cases require ‘queer contex-
tualisation’.10 He pursues this strategy within a discussion of ‘substantive equality’ – a
form of recognition that seeks to remedy socio-historical inequalities contributing to
sexual minority marginalisation.11 These scholars make visible the importance of
parsing progressive legal claims through a queer critique of existing social norms.
Moreover, queer legal scholars have drawn attention to how legal violence (which
includes punitive laws, administrative burdens, and ethnocentric representations of sexu-
ality) has become justified in the pursuit of progressive legal projects.12 As Marc Spindel-
man suggests, we should be cautious of using a homophobic legal system to remedy
homophobic harms.13 Queer sexual freedom cannot be sourced within the moral
economy of the law – it develops in its ‘shadow’.14 Law reform privileges assimilation
into an existing legal ‘discipline’, rather than contesting the institutional violence that
such orders produce.15
Such a dynamic treatment of legal interventions raises the complex relationship law has
to both individual and institutional concerns of advancing justice for LGBTI minorities. In
order to navigate the limits of legal progress, I want to ‘queer’ the affective recognition of
injury, intimacy, and identity. I use queer as a critical theoretical tool alongside my analysis
of emotion (outlined below) to draw out the discomfort, resistance, transition, and trouble
in cases that seek to progress sexual and gender minorities from a position of injury and to
enable their intimacies and identities.16 As activist legal scholars, this analysis allows us to
deconstruct emotional enactments of progressive cases by troubling the socio-legal norms
of injury, intimacy, and identity they shape. Yet, as Aleardo Zanghellini observes, queer is
not limited to deconstruction or antinormativity. The appeal of using queer theory to read
emotion in jurisprudence, then, lies in the normative, political commitments for justice
that this queer reading can affirm.17 In foregrounding these commitments, I want to
urge those engaged in legal activism (such as judicial review and statutory reform) and
critical legal scholarship (such as critical writing about law reform and legal rights)
about queer minorities to recognise how emotion shapes specific legal claims and use
emotion as a methodological lens to navigate the reach of legal progress aimed at support-
ing LGBTI people.
As queer activist legal scholars seeking to simultaneously navigate demands for decon-
struction and affirmation, we need a theoretical framework to evaluate claims of state rec-
ognition in relation to queer minorities.18 I attempt to provide this by combining the use of
queer as a critical mode of analysis with the category of ‘pro-LGBTI cases’ to offer an ana-
lytic lens for activist-scholars working within legal institutions, particularly those engaged
with judicial review, to register the ways in which jurisprudence remedies queer
injuries and enable intimacies and identities. As such, my references to pro-LGBTI
cases are not meant to be exhaustive or doctrinally self-contained. Indeed, ‘LGBTI’ is
an activist label that is culturally contingent.19 I adopt the more inclusive label of pro-
LGBTI rather than ‘pro-gay’ here because the cases discussed in this paper have doctrinal
implications for bisexual, lesbian, trans or gender-nonconforming, and intersex min-
orities. I focus on judgments here because they are data that evince the ways law
reform goals, statutes, precedents, and parties come into contact.20 They enable us to
see the embodiment of law in both specific terms (the remedies for particular parties)
and general terms (the precedents they establish and the social norms they express).
I collate these cases on the basis of activist legal scholars having celebrated them as pro-
gressive in the pursuit of visibility and equality. Yet, this collation follows a queer call to
move against ‘proper objects’.21 Rather than ‘properly’ focus on judgments as a set of doc-
trines or style of legal writing within a specific jurisdiction, I look at how and why we
should read pro-LGBTI cases in a (queer) register of emotion. In cases designed to pro-
gress the human rights of LGBTI minorities, judicial decisions do not only have to
engage with the emotions that animate LGBTI individuals seeking progress, they also
distil these emotions through the text of judgments that activist legal scholars subsequently
hail as progressive.
Reading emotion
In writing about emotional enactments in pro-LGBTI cases, activist scholars must first
recognise how our scholarship is a product of them as well. Pain, disgust, hate, anger,
fear, and happiness have underpinned my own encounters, as an activist legal scholar,
with the judicial texts that form my queer catalogue of case studies. It is important to pos-
ition my own emotional investment in pro-LGBTI cases because, as a queer individual, I
subscribe to the hope that legal progress will remedy experiences of injury and my inti-
macy and identity will be given greater support as a consequence of recognition. Yet,
such emotional investments, as outlined below, can fail to address systemic queer subor-
dination. In Object Lessons, Robyn Wiegman observes, ‘identity knowledges are animated
by powerful political desires’.22 Such disciplinary logics are informed by the desire to
reveal the way in which norms and dominant knowledge systems shape particular
objects of inquiry (in my case, jurisprudence). Like all activist scholars, it is difficult to sep-
arate my investments in particular emotions from investments that reveal the emotions
that form the object of my scholarly inquiry. My own desires for justice animated this criti-
cal inquiry. Rather than eschew such desires, I have chosen to give effect to them by pursu-
ing a reading of emotion at the intersections of law and queerness in order to contribute
greater insights into how ideas of injury, intimacy, and identity are shaped in the
pro-LGBTI cases that I bring together. While I do not labour over personal emotions
that arise, as I read pro-LGBTI hate crime and marriage equality cases in the sections
below, I want to preface that reading emotion is an emotional process. It is a process
that generates an array of, and sometimes contradictory, emotional responses from the
activist-scholar reader. Personal emotions inevitably shape how I organise and analyse
the following cases. I offer this as a caution, then, against attempts to turn the queer analy-
sis of emotion in law I offer into a disembodied or abstracted methodology.
Contributing to an activist legal scholarly community motivated by disparate emotions
for social justice involves moving beyond legal scholarship that diagnoses individual doc-
trines or focuses on institutional reform. In a provocative article titled ‘On Writing
Dangerously’, Fleur Johns articulates the need to engage in forms of legal research that
interrupt the demand for ‘real world’ solutions.23 In a changing world, law is often
invoked at moments of crisis that generate impulses for regulation. Legal scholars often
arrive at such crises with a ‘problem-solving’ mentality that imagines the problem as
something external to the legal academic.24 Framing legal research in this way,
however, discourages more reflexive and adaptive legal analysis that addresses the orien-
tations, attachments, and complicities that researchers have within legal institutions. Pur-
suing this sort of analysis, in the activist legal scholarship I wish to develop, requires a
queer focus on what it means to pursue progressive, activist legal analysis. Ambivalence
and hesitation in activist movements engender their own risks (such as delaying legislative
or policy responses to anti-LGBTI violence or discrimination) – this is precisely why such
writing is dangerous.25 As activist legal scholars, however, we must pursue legal agendas
for social change while emotionally reflecting on what is at stake in the socio-legal claims
we make.
Emotion circulates ubiquitously in law: from the emotional states of parties, to the gut
reactions of juries or legal scholars, to passionate legislative debates. In thinking about
emotion, rendering it into an object of scholarly inquiry, we seek to see what we (or
others) feel.26 My use of emotion, however, does not seek to claim sense of the feelings
of litigants, lawyers, and judges, nor do I try to diagnose the feelings of legal actors or insti-
tutions. My reading sits in contradistinction to other law and emotion scholarship; it does
not pursue an analysis of emotion as a personal experience, social cultivation, and/or
psychological process.27
Bearing this in mind, I have chosen to develop a queer reading of emotion that looks at
it as a textual enactment of judicial decisions. I situate ‘law’ here as a field that exhibits
literary or narrative tendencies. As James Boyd White argues, law is a disciplinary
terrain generated through disparate narrative acts that include legislative enactments, liti-
gation, testimony, and judicial pronouncements.28 These acts develop a ‘textual commu-
nity’ through officially designated actors such as lawyers, judges, and legislators working in
official institutions such as courts, tribunals, and parliaments. My reason for attending to
emotion and law in terms of case law’s textual properties is that conversations about
emotion in law tend to focus on the emotions of parties or the phenomenological experi-
ences of judges, rather than exploring how emotion assumes legal significance through
embodiment in judicial texts.29 Activist legal scholars concerned with LGBTI minorities
must take account of emotion at this level – to address the legal politics of emotion –
because these decisions function as both social and legal measures of queer injury, inti-
macy, and identity.
My argument focuses on the performative dimensions of emotion, and the insights
gained from this focus allow me to problematise how emotions shape (hetero)normative
ideas of queer identity, intimacy, and injury in the pursuit of legal progress. I develop a
queer reading of jurisprudence, as an activist legal scholar, by foregrounding emotions
instead of doctrines in order to rethink the claims of progress articulated through such
emotions. Eve Sedgwick describes the sort of reading strategy I adopt as an ‘affect
theory’. Such a theory is ‘queer’ because it relies on ‘selective scanning’ and ‘amplification’
in order to resist normative scholarly tendencies to aggregate or taxonomise so as to
‘prove’ an object (such as injury, intimacy, or identity) of thought conclusively.30 I trans-
pose Sedgwick’s call to loosen the need for diagnostic analysis in favour of amplifying
emotion when selectively reading how it emerges in pro-LGBTI cases. I do not categori-
cally define emotions nor do I exhaustively try to document how they manifest in law.
Rather, I register the enactment of specific emotions. Drawing from Sara Ahmed, this reg-
ister takes emotions in terms of their textual features: they animate legal ideas and shape
social norms in judgments.31 These emotional enactments arise from the contact between
objects.32 To read emotion, I follow the contact between objects (such as doctrines, facts,
and norms) that shape queer injuries, intimacies, and identities and the remedies deemed
to address or repair them. Attending to case law in terms of these contact zones, by focus-
ing on their enactments, helps to expose legal biases and (hetero)normative limits they
give effect to.33
Reading emotion as a scholarly strategy is a form of activist engagement.34 Using
emotion as an analytic framework to engage with pro-LGBTI cases allows us to register
the particular ways these cases recognise queer injury, intimacy, and identity and this
enables us to navigate the legal and social consequences of these forms of recognition.
As Kenji Yoshino argues, in relation to sexual minorities, ideas of gay visibility cannot
be reduced to who is ‘in’ or ‘out’ of the proverbial closet. Rather, social norms allow
sexual minorities to express some forms of their sexuality in public while urging them
to ‘cover’ more discomforting aspects of their sexual life.35 Borrowing from Yoshino’s
idea of covering in relation to sexual minorities, I argue that emotional norms in case
law that enable new forms of individual recognition and visibility can work, paradoxically,
to cover over other institutional forms of injury, intimacy, and identity. While this paper
speaks to the institutional possibilities of better judgments, my purpose when reading
emotion is to primarily account for the affective reasons of jurisprudential recognition
in pro-LGBTI cases without critiquing all emotions or offering emotion as a prescription
for securing LGBTI human rights. This focus is significant for queer activist legal scholars
who seek to further legal projects concerned with human rights agendas while maintaining
a deeper, critical, and affective engagement with the terms of those agendas. In the follow-
ing sections, I want to show that using emotion as an analytic lens allows us, as activist
legal scholars, to more richly register the consequences of ‘progress’ in order for us to
explore or critique the affective trouble queer injury, intimacy, and identity pose in
cases concerned with healing hate and liberating love.
Healing hate and hate crime jurisprudence
In order to tease out how we can read emotion in pro-LGBTI cases, I now turn to the way
criminal law functions to address queer injury through the Hate Crimes Prevention Act of
2009 and associated jurisprudence in the US. Specifically, the marking out of identity
differences, acts of injury, and the intimacy between victims and offenders, is key to the
construction of hate in pro-LGBTI criminal law reform. In recent decades, the recognition
of homophobic and transphobic violence has precipitated public demands for criminali-
sation to deal with what is often colloquially referred to as ‘hate crimes’. This demand
reflects a remarkable shift in the positioning of queer bodies in the criminal law: homo-
sexual criminalisation is replaced by a criminalisation of (some) homophobes. The
violent homophobe is a queer body because they disturb a social order purporting to ‘tol-
erate’ sexual difference. Like the formerly criminalised homosexual, criminalised homo-
phobes act in ways that cannot be socially assimilated. As Ely Aharonson observes, this
shift towards criminalisation is about citizenship: hate crimes are imagined as a threat
to the state’s interest in equality, and thus ‘pro-minority criminalisation’ becomes a strat-
egy for reasserting ideals of egalitarian citizenship.36 Communities, in addition to individ-
ual citizens, are seen as injured by hate crimes.
In the US, following the brutal murders of James Byrd Jr. and Matthew Shepard, there
was overwhelming activist mobilisation demanding federal penalties for racist and homo-
phobic violence.37 It is important to note that while the US Congress had previously
enacted the Hate Crimes Statistics Act of 1990, the federal impetus to investigate hate
crimes was limited to data collection rather than individual prosecutions (as the acts in
question were otherwise criminal already). Such legislation was subject to enormous cri-
tique for its discretionary application and lack of punitive effects.38 The legislation also
failed to account for gender-identity-motivated violence. Hate crime was being recorded,
but little was being done at a federal level to prevent it. Legislation was introduced follow-
ing those two highly publicised homicides as an attempt to supplement the perceived stat-
utory deficiencies.39 Former US President Barack Obama, in commemorating the
enactment of the Hate Crimes Prevention Act, emphasised that ‘no one in America
should ever be afraid to walk down the street holding the hands of the person they
love’.40 He continued, ‘we must stand against crimes that are meant not only to break
bones, but to break spirits’.41 Here, love and hope were invoked to ‘stand’ against the
fears and injuries generated by hate crime.
Reading this presidential pronouncement affectively, we can observe how the claim to
optimism and futurity marks a contrast to the treatment of homosexuality as threat.
Instead of (partially) locating responsibility for death on the victim’s sexually assertive
or ‘threatening’ behaviour, hate crime laws work to refuse what Obama referred to here
as the crimes that ‘break spirits’. Obama invoked hate crime law as both the recognition
of the ‘seriousness’ of such violence and the remedy capable of ‘healing’ insecurity within
the community (in this instance, the gay and lesbian community). Obama’s celebration of
hate crime legislation operated at the level of metaphor: non-heterosexuality was particu-
larised through sentimental and uncontroversial tropes such as love and ‘holding hands’.
The non-explicit intimate bonds between two people were marked out as worthy of pro-
tection. In other words, queers who love by exhibiting romantic intimacies or domesti-
cated identities were to be protected from the brutality of injury.
Criminalising hate crime requires more than holding individual offenders accountable
for ill feeling or acts of violence. Legislative responses seek to secure the civil rights of sub-
ordinated groups through punitive sanctions directed against violent bigots. They signify a
number of emotional investments primarily by invoking a public urgency to address
homophobia and restore social order.42 In the Hate Crimes Prevention Act, the
‘findings’ preamble notes that hate crime ‘disrupts the tranquillity and safety of commu-
nities’.43 The findings also go on to state that such violence ‘devastates not just the actual
victim and the family and friends of the victim, but frequently savages the community
sharing the traits that caused the victim to be selected’.44 The legislation purports to recog-
nise the intimate associations between the victims, their families, and the broader commu-
nity to which the victims belong. In doing so, it imagines the national community as
tolerant and inclusive and casts those who would be liable under the Act as violent inter-
lopers in the community.
This is a process in which homophobes, instead of homosexuals, are made queer (in
the sense that they are socially deviant) to the community. In discussing the Hate Crimes
Prevention Act, Obama’s analogising of hate crime with ‘savagery’ stigmatised offenders
as barbaric or uncivilised, while his comments sentimentalised the community as a hom-
ogenous site of ‘tranquillity’. In sentimentalising the community as always already safe
and welcoming, Obama deemed those who expressed violent homophobia as lacking
self-control. These individuals became emotionally aberrant by virtue of their savage
ill feeling towards homosexuality, and that ill feeling threatened an otherwise tranquil
community. In Bennett v Texas (1992), for example, the defendant appealed his sentence
for murdering a gay man on the basis that it was excessive. On appeal, Barajas J affirmed
the trial decision, noting that the ‘excessive’ violence (in this case, anal injuries) was pun-
ished with a term of incarceration of 60 years – a sentence held appropriate rather than
excessive.45 While the case predated the existence of specific hate crime legislation, it is
interesting to note how excessive violence was construed as disruptive to the social order
and needed to be contained through enhanced (but legally appropriate) penalties. By
redirecting hostility from the victim to the perpetrator, Bennett showed how homopho-
bia was relatively easy to delineate when described in terms of a single offence and
offender.
However, these emotional enactments do not correspond with material change. Sym-
bolic references in pro-LGBTI hate crime cases to both violent excess and calculated sen-
tencing place greater emphasis on the criminal law rationale of individual responsibility,
rather than taking account of different political and social structures of subordination.46
The Hate Crimes Prevention Act positions homophobic violence (among other forms of
minoritarian identity-based violence) as something antithetical to a national order,
rather than as a phenomenon implicated directly within it.47 The exceptionalism
invoked in legal responses to hate crime is important to note because we must consider
the symbolic effects of hate crime legislation and the excessive violence that it enacts.
The Hate Crimes Prevention Act institutes assumptions that homophobes are both
‘wilful’ and exceptional in the community.
The emotional interests of the state in delineating definitional narrowness for hate
crime laws are privileged over the queer experiences of both perpetrators and victims of
homophobic and transphobic violence. By transposing my earlier political discussion of
the Hate Crimes Prevention Act into the judicial arena, we can observe how the legislation
has criminalised wilful bodily injury (and death) because of the victim’s actual or perceived
sexual orientation or gender identity.48 This hate crime law mobilises hostility against
wilful offenders while leaving the social will untouched in terms of responsibility for
queer exclusion. It is interesting to note the use of the word ‘wilful’ here – it designates
wilfulness on the part of the individual or offender. The wilful offender is one who
obstructs the harmonious social fabric by bringing social intolerance into the fold.49 In
doing so, such offenders who hate (sexual minorities) are made inassimilable – queer to
a purportedly tolerant society.
In the leading case upholding the validity of the law, Glenn v Holder (2010), the US
District Court refused standing to a conservative family association on the basis that
causing ‘headaches and stomachaches’ to sexual minorities (a risk posed by the views
that this group espoused) did not form a ‘particular interest’ that would generate a threat
of prosecution under the Act.50 It is interesting to note that in opposing the legislation,
the family association recognised the emotional dimensions of homophobic injury
(including speech) – particularly ones causing bodily discomfort. While the Court
upheld the validity of the federal hate crime statute, it did so noting that, for any
federal prosecutions to succeed, federal authorities would need to demonstrate a mali-
cious intent to cause bodily injury that excluded emotional shock or disorienting quea-
siness. Moreover, the judgment held that prosecutions must prove that the violence was
attributable to a victim’s (purported) sexual orientation or gender identity. Gwin J
affirmed this position on appeal to the US Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, where the
majority held that the appellant’s fear of prosecution for its views on homosexuality
was misplaced.51 In fact, in a footnote, Gwin J held that the appellant had undertaken
a ‘tortured’ reading of the Act.52 The Court’s fleeting reference to pain worked to sep-
arate the ‘less serious’ forms of homophobic speech from the recognition of homophobic
violence. While the appellant accepted that their homophobic speech was violent, the
Court was quick to refuse that assertion to sustain the constitutional validity of the
Act. Criminalising hate crime was given limited scope: it extended to intentional phys-
ical violence while expressly excluding pernicious forms of hate speech and other
psychic injuries.53 Such queer references in the appellant’s argument were dismissed
in the appellate judgment. The Court privileged physical scars over emotional hurt
when it came to recognising injury.
Despite the casual tendency to refer to homophobic violence as necessarily a hate crime,
a number of legal commentators have expressed caution regarding the conceptual ‘cleanli-
ness’ of, and the vociferous demand to use, the term. As James Jacobs and Kimberley
Potter argue, reading anti-gay violence by reference to a causal explanation of individual
hatred confuses the complex interaction of opportunities and institutions.54 The emphasis
on hate alone tends to obscure the complex economy of emotions: the violence produces
identities of vulnerability by spreading intimidation and fear to those who identify with the
social position of the victim.
These emotions become more apparent in institutional support. For example, the
failure to appreciate this emotional point was illustrated in United States v Jenkins
(2012), where Van Tatenhove J held that ‘there is no significant economic market for
bias motivated crime’.55 While the reasoning in the case concentrated on the consti-
tutional validity of using the commerce clause to criminalise hate crime federally, his
point affirmed the way in which hate crimes were read as individual acts of aberrant vio-
lence rather than as an institutionally entrenched (in this case economic) phenomenon.
Hate crimes may be socially injurious, but the responsibility for such injuries lay with indi-
vidual rather than other institutional actors. In this case, the Court held that the Hate
Crimes Prevention Act must be expressed in a ‘limited fashion’ to avoid overreaching
into state jurisdiction.56 Hate crime violence was localised to mean physical acts that
were, in some way, detrimental to federal commerce.
We can describe the emotional economies of victimhood and offending in pro-LGBTI
hate crime cases quite simply: the pitied victimised queer object has its value pitted against
the hated homophobic object, and the law works as the instrument to emotionally measure
the value of both objects. Bringing together the jurisprudence surrounding the Hate
Crimes Prevention Act with a broader public insistence on criminalising homophobic
and transphobic violence, we can observe how hate crime functions as a moral category that
generates ‘emotional thinking’ among the public as part of a call for social justice.57 Legal
interventions directed at punishing homophobic and transphobic violence become a/
effective ‘morality plays’ that involve rejecting the injurious prejudice exhibited by
offenders and respecting the intimacy and identity of the victims.58 In particular, the label-
ling of violence as a hate crime is contingent on the capacity to recognise the hate of perpe-
trators while generating compassion or pity for the victim who is subject to such hate.59
Obama’s words welcoming the Hate Crimes Prevention Act are apt here: ‘we sense where
such cruelty begins… the moment we fail to see in another our common humanity’.60 Com-
passion becomes a key emotional enactment for securing moral claims for respect and rec-
ognition. Victimsmust be palatable objects amenable to becoming the subject of sentimental
narratives involving a ‘common humanity’ in order to garner support.61 The characteris-
ation of a particular act of injury as a hate crime is ‘compelled’ by the extent to which per-
petrators and victims can subscribe to social archetypes and generate the emotional
resonances stereotypically associated with their respective identities. Hate crimes and the
judicial responses that deal with them perform a public theatre involving claims for
inclusion and recognition. Neither victim nor perpetrator can be too queer or they risk
being (emotionally) excluded from the narrative.
In this context, it becomes apparent how emotions serve as the anchoring points for
legislative and political visibility. In contrast to laws criminalising sodomy, pro-LGBTI
hate crime cases redirect the meanings of criminality, anxiety, and deviance from homo-
sexuals to homophobes.62 Yet, the progressive emotional redirection in cases such as
Glenn and Jenkins relied on a personalising narrative of hate that limited the scope for
recognising the banal institutional entrenchment of homophobia. Accommodating
queer claims for inclusion relied on personalising homophobic hatred and its remedies,
rather than reshaping existing institutional practices. Hate crime laws may render queer
victims visible and punish anti-queer offenders, but they do so at a cost – the covering
over of institutional accountability.
Judicial decisions (when giving effect to particular statutes) play an instrumental role in
emotionally construing homosexuality in contradictory ways. Queers can be rendered
objects of scorn, revulsion, and/or pity for the public. The Hate Crimes Prevention Act
recognises homophobic and transphobic injury insofar as it results in a ‘bodily injury’
defined against psychic or identity traumas. The preambular references to ‘free speech’
in the legislation work to disassociate homophobic and transphobic violence from
hateful speech. The law maintains certain kinds of homophobic and transphobic injuries
(verbal taunts and psychological damage) and disregards them in its attempt to remedy or
eradicate them. By enacting hate in pro-LGBTI cases, as referenced in the Hate Crimes
Prevention Act and associated jurisprudence, the state is able to exhibit a formal condem-
nation of homophobic and transphobic injury – while covering structural aspects of its
existence. For activist legal scholars wishing to counteract the impacts of homophobia,
reading emotion offers a way to register the socio-legal consequences of hate crime law
while reflecting on whether the pursuit of heightened criminal penalties will secure the
safety of queer minorities and/or minimise the ways the state participates in the margin-
alisation of queers. This approach does not abandon activist demands to hold homo-
phobes accountable for violence but rather provides a lens to navigate how those
demands are emotionally articulated through progressive jurisprudence.
Liberating love and marriage equality jurisprudence
In contrast to criminal law and the enactment of hate to punish homophobes, LGBTI
people have simultaneously turned to constitutional law to affirm their intimacies and
identities. Marriage, in particular, is prized as the ultimate affirmation of social inclusion.63
In taking this further, I want to look at how pro-LGBTI marriage equality cases enact love
to circumscribe legal recognition in problematic ways. California offers us a rich example
of this. California’s move towards marriage equality began in 2004. Following the legalisa-
tion of marriage equality in Massachusetts, San Francisco Mayor Gavin Newsom ordered
that county clerks issue same-sex couples with marriage licences.64 A few years earlier, the
California Family Code had been amended by a public ballot to restrict the definition of
marriage to opposite-sex couples. Newsom believed, however, given the outcome in Mas-
sachusetts, that such a ban was inconsistent with California’s (similarly drafted) state con-
stitution. In response, he opened up the city to solemnising same-sex marriages. Same-sex
couples flocked from around the state (and from other parts of the country) to get married.
Within weeks, the Supreme Court of California nullified the marriages that had taken
place.65
Bolstered by the promise of love (alongside desires for equality), the lead plaintiff
couples and the City of San Francisco sought a declaration that the statutory definition
of marriage breached the liberty and equality guarantees of the state’s constitution.66
The In Re Marriage Cases consolidated six appeals from various couples across the
state. At the California Court of Appeal, the claims were dismissed on the basis that the
gender-specific marriage laws were ‘rationally’ enacted and there was no ‘fundamental
right’ to a same-sex marriage. In delivering the majority opinion, McGuiness PJ subordi-
nated private expressions of love to the ‘public role’marriage played in ‘organizing funda-
mental aspects of our society’.67 Denying same-sex marriage was not a denial of privacy,
but rather amounted to a rational decision by the public to preserve the institution for its
traditional procreative purposes.68 Rather than consider the issue as one of (denying)
liberty, the majority focused on the unique institutional features of marriage to justify
exclusion.
Moreover, in the California Court of Appeal, love and privacy were decoupled from
marriage and publicity, respectively, to distinguish same-sex and heterosexual forms of
love. The Court held that same-sex couples were not seeking to end government interfer-
ence or criminalisation; they were aspiring for government imprimatur of their intima-
cies.69 That was not a constitutional issue of privacy or liberty, but one of permissible
‘state interests’. If same-sex marriage was to become legal, the issue needed to be
decided by the people and their elected representatives – not the courts.70
In the dissent, however, marriage was cast as a love of liberty (not just of a partner).
Kline J, in dissent, held that pursuing marriage was a ‘self-defining’ feature of personal
integrity. Kline J refuted the majority’s framing of privacy and forcefully argued for a
more expansive view of privacy that encompassed the intimacy of same-sex couples.
Kline J held:
Themarital relationship is within the zone of autonomy protected by the right of privacy not just
because of the profound nature of the attachment and commitment that marriage represents, the
material benefits it provides, and the social ordering it furthers, but also because the decision to
marry represents one of the most self-defining decisions an individual can make.71
In Kline J’s account, marriage not only ordered intimacy, but also provided the basis
through which individuals could define their identities. The private and public blurred
together: personal attachment and commitment could be publicly recognised both mate-
rially and socially. By denying same-sex couples the right to pursue marriage, the state
interfered with the private expression of intimacy. Marital exclusion was an arbitrary
state obstacle to couples seeking to express love. Moreover, treating expressions of
same-sex love (such as declarations of commitment or decisions to have children) as
different from heterosexual love for the purpose of public regulation suppressed individ-
uals’ public expression.72 Children also figured in this expression of ordered liberty.
Denying children the formality of married parents perniciously impacted on their lives
by disallowing their families the social and legal security of marriage.
The Court of Appeal’s decision was overturned on appeal to the California Supreme
Court. Kline J’s dissent about the connections between liberty, love, and family was
more favourably received than the majority’s holding about the ‘rational basis’ of ‘tra-
ditional marriage’. George CJ concluded:
In view of the substance and significance of the fundamental constitutional right to form a
family relationship, the California Constitution properly must be interpreted to guarantee
this basic civil right to all Californians, whether gay or heterosexual, and to same-sex
couples as well as opposite-sex couples.73
In the California Supreme Court, liberty was tied to intimacy: a right to formulate relation-
ships. The Court refused to distinguish privacy and kinship.74 The autonomy to form a
family was blocked by the state’s refusal to grant a marriage licence. Marriage was not a
privilege granted by the government but a civil right mandated by the Constitution.
Yet, the continued invocation of family was also used to sustain the intimacy between
liberty and living well. In particular, marriage was not simply a subpart of the right to inti-
mate association.75 Rather, it remained an opportunity to be recognised ‘with a loved one’
that was of the ‘deepest and utmost importance’ to the individual or couple.76 Such liberty
was about securing love.
Loving liberty secured loving same-sex intimacies. In bringing together liberty and
intimacy, George CJ held that marriage afforded the plaintiffs an ‘opportunity to live
a happy, meaningful, and satisfying life as a full member of society’.77 By enacting
marital love in terms of wellbeing and satisfaction, marriage accrued value by enabling
the liberty of those seeking access to the institution. This also had a productive poten-
tial: it channelled same-sex intimacies from the injury of exclusion into satisfying part-
nerships. While the majority opinion in the case eschewed the contention that marriage
could be restricted to a ‘responsible’ reproductive purpose, the claim of love (re)enacted
in this case rendered marital love synonymous with the notion of relationship stability.
Liberty was invoked through love to help overturn the statutory bar on same-sex mar-
riage. While hate consigned homophobes to criminality, love badged gay relationships
with respectability.
Following the decision of the California Supreme Court, a number of groups petitioned
the state to give the public the final say on same-sex marriage by subjecting it to a popular
vote. Dubbed Proposition 8, an amendment was put at the 2008 election to constitution-
ally define marriage as the union between a man and a woman.78 Both sides, in a vicious
public campaign, spent millions of dollars to sway Californian voters. Proposition 8 passed
narrowly, with 52% of the public vote. Proponents of the measure were successful largely
by framing the issue in terms of (threats to) children: ‘We should not accept a court
decision that may result in public schools teaching our own kids that gay marriage is
ok’.79 The amendment created a precarious legal environment for same-sex couples in
the state. As the amendment was designed to have only prospective effect, the 18,000
same-sex marriages solemnised prior to its passage remained valid. Yet, same-sex
couples were now unable to get married. This created a situation where some same-sex
relationships were recognised as marriages, while others were not.
Divergences in recognition prompted an immediate challenge on procedural grounds
relating to the constitutional amendments. These appeals were dismissed on the basis
that the Constitution was validly amended by a proper process.80 This then led to a chal-
lenge on federal constitutional grounds in Perry v Schwarzenegger (2010). This case
involved a group of same-sex couples (who came from different cultural backgrounds
and had been together for different lengths of time) to resolve a constitutional question:
did the bar on same-sex marriage violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the US Constitution?81
At trial, the plaintiffs testified about what marriage meant to them as a matter of love.
Lead plaintiff Sandy Stier distinguished between domestic partnerships and marriage:
There is certainly nothing about domestic partnership as an institution – not even as an insti-
tution, but as a legal agreement that indicates the love and commitment that are inherent in
marriage and [domestic partnership] doesn’t have anything to do for us with the nature of
our relationship and the type of enduring relationship we want it to be.82
Stier’s plea for recognition concentrated on the liberty to define the relationship in the
terms that she (and her partner) deemed appropriate. The term ‘domestic partnership’
may have offered equivalent legal benefits, but it was not imbued with the love and com-
mitment that were promised by marriage. The enactment of love – realised in an enduring
relationship – was the main reason why the plaintiffs sought (and were granted) injunctive
relief from the Court against Proposition 8: they wanted the liberty to proclaim their love.
Marital love also created a sense of ‘weightiness’ to legal recognition. Walker CJ found
that the denial of same-sex marriage interfered with the right to intimate expression. As a
matter of law, neither side contested the idea that marriage was a ‘fundamental right’.83
Rather, the dispute hinged on what characteristics made the right fundamental.
Drawing on the language from the California Supreme Court’s earlier decision in the In
Re Marriage Cases and expert testimony provided to the Court, Walker CJ held that
same-sex couples were ‘identical’ to their opposite-sex counterparts when it came to
forming ‘deep emotional bonds and strong commitments’.84 Legal recognition of same-
sex marriage, therefore, provided an additional dimension of legitimacy and integration
to existing cultural practices (such as same-sex commitment ceremonies). Same-sex
couples were not seeking to acquire a new right; they were merely asserting their existing
right to marry a partner of their choice. By making this claim, Walker CJ used love to show
that marriage could not rationally be considered a gendered issue. Yet, while the foun-
dations of marital love were no longer gendered, the worthiness of its foundations as a
‘shiny’ or noble expression of intimacy remained uncontested.
Marriage equality is a powerful love story – one that the Californian courts
scripted through a plot of order, maturity, and commitment. Unlike pro-LGBTI hate
crime cases that work to police (homophobic) subjects, pro-LGBTI marriage equality
cases seek to privilege the intimacies of (gay) subjects. As Walker CJ held in Perry, mar-
riage provided a social order through which same-sex couples could find love from
‘deep emotional bonds’ and ‘strong commitments’.85 Love made way here for couples
that had their ability to express such commitment blocked by gendered definitions of
marriage.
Insidiously, these enactments of love work to police queer intimacies. As Casey Charles
notes, queers have survived by protesting reproductive sexual assimilation.86 Mutually
supportive communities and associations have been encouraged (in varied erotic, inter-
generational, caring, platonic forms) over recognition that privileges the couple as the
primary vehicle for recognising intimacy.87 In Perry, Sandy Stier invoked love as the
means by which to claim the right to ‘self-define’ her relationship with her partner,
Kristin Perry.88 The Court’s love of liberty – as a principle central to US constitutionalism
– granted her that right. Law had the power to provide a (marital) way for people to deter-
mine their happy endings. Yet, reading pro-LGBTI marriage equality cases in a register of
emotion can expose their inability to liberate self-defining intimacies that disrupt enact-
ments of love that centre on notions of monogamy and fidelity. In Why Love Leads to
Justice, David Richards argues that love creates a ‘resisting voice’ to free us from the
oppressive force of patriarchy.89 By loving across racial and gendered boundaries, he
notes that we can free ourselves from the ‘moral slavery’ of norms and institutions that
deny us our autonomy and integrity.90 However, as my reading of pro-LGBTI marriage
equality cases cautions, love can create an ‘affective slavery’ – where love works to bind
same-sex couples into specific heteronormative fantasies of constitutional liberty. Mar-
riage becomes a pairing of two people who purportedly commit by forsaking all others.
The push to exclude others from marriage (such as those in non-dyadic relationships)
was an act of subordination and non-recognition.91 By distinguishing polyamory (and
polygamy) from marriage equality, these cases closed off the purported ‘slippery slope’
invoked by opponents.92 Put simply, the love to affirm and maintain an exclusive com-
mitment with one person evident in Perry and In Re Marriage Cases (2006, 2008) was
distinct from the desire to marry multiple people. Love did not cross boundaries.
Instead, it solidified intimacy into a pair. Here, I would add that non-recognition is an
emotional matter of law: queer intimacies that disturb, disgust, or threaten the ‘loving
definitions’ of marriage (such as polygamy or promiscuity) are covered over in the
same moment that the doctrinal definitions are partially opened up to affirm loving
same-sex couples.
By attending to emotion – registering the enactments of love – activist legal scholars can
observe how courts circumscribe the limits of what love makes possible in terms of legal
recognition of same-sex relationships. Jurisprudential claims of love cover over the ways in
which the state marginalises queers. Making this visible is critical at a time when activists
and lawyers turn to courts to secure greater liberties. By taking account of how love func-
tions to shape a specific idea of kinship, activist scholars can pause to reflect on the queer
intimacies erased by such enactments of love. This does not require us to abandon mar-
riage equality as a way to provide rights and recognition to same-sex couples. However,
reading emotion allows us to emotionally (re)think how we advance claims for relation-
ship recognition and makes space for queer intimacies that do not conform to existing
(hetero)normative legal formulations of love.
Conclusion
Activist legal scholars animated by claims for queer justice must register emotion in jur-
isprudential claims of progress. By reading emotion, this paper does not suggest that
courts let go of their responsibilities to adjudicate, or that the law remove itself from
attempting to remedy queer exclusions. Taking emotion seriously in activist legal scholar-
ship is not about choosing sides among activists who condemn the law, those who urge us
to embrace it, or even those who sit in between this ever-expanding spectrum of opinions
(after all, existing activist legal scholarship does not sit in neat binaries). Instead, my
reading in a register of emotion, borne through an exploration of US hate crime and mar-
riage equality jurisprudence, exposes what is made visible and what is covered over in pro-
LGBTI cases that purport to repair queer injury and further queer intimacy and identity.
In the pursuit to criminalise and punish violent homophobes, pro-LGBTI hate crime cases
risk covering the emotional, as well social, conditions that make queer injury possible.
Alternatively, pursuits to anchor love to relationship recognition produce sentimental for-
mulations of kinship that risk covering over transient, abject or socially unproductive
queer intimacies and identities.
By analysing queer injury, intimacy, and identity in two different sites of pro-LGBTI
cases, this paper has shown how both hate crime and marriage equality jurisprudence
in the US has worked to deny the recognition of those who were emotionally queer to a
legal order that sustained certain emotional sentiments (such as the ‘homophobic hater’
or ‘loving couple’). In other words, the emotional enactments in each area of jurisprudence
allowed certain forms of queer injury, intimacy, or identity to be made visible while also
covering over more structural or sustained forms of exclusions that queers faced on a daily
basis.
Reading emotions as legal enactments better equips us, as activist legal scholars, to
address their socio-legal consequences in progressive activist agendas. We do not have
to expel or embrace emotion (as if either were possible) in law to further the rights of
LGBTI people. Rather, we must contend with emotion in our pursuits of recognition.
This is not limited to LGBTI issues. Using emotion to queer progress will also enable acti-
vist-scholars in other areas to expose the insidious consequences of law reform and nuance
our responses to emotion when seeking to advance the rights of minorities through law.
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